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ABSTRACT 
CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT OF THAI COMMERCIAL BANKS 
AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
By 
Nipha Preedanond 
 
Thai banks suffered a great loss after the financial crisis in 1997.  Poor credit risk 
management was one of the reasons for the failure.  After the financial crisis, however, 
the Thai authorities and Thai banks have proved to learn their lessons.  Thai authorities 
restructured the Thai financial infrastructure in several areas such as the introduction of 
the Financial Master Plan, the establishment of deposit insurance and credit bureau, the 
use of asset management companies, and the adoption of Basel II in 2004.   Several 
regulatory measures are introduced to improve the credit risk management of Thai banks 
especially in the area of asset classification, collateral assessment, connected lending, loan 
review, and credit in real estate sector.  In the meantime, Thai banks have developed 
their credit risk management system so as to be in line with that of international best 
practices and the Bank of Thailand’s requirements. The developments include 
restructuring banks’ credit risk management processes, establishing systematic loan 
grading and standardized internal rating, employing credit portfolio management models, 
and investing in IT infrastructure.  Although Thai banks and Thai authorities have 
shown a great improvement after the crisis, some challenges still remain for them to 
work on for the betterment of credit risk management in Thailand. 
___________________ 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS 
One cause of the problems that led to the financial crisis in 1997 was bad credit risk 
management in the Thai financial system.  In the pre-crisis period when the economy 
was at its peak, Thai banks and their subsidiary finance companies lent aggressively.   
Poor lending practices were widely practices among the banks’ executives, especially the 
problem of insider lending.  The situation was exacerbated by lax supervision and an 
outdated legal framework. 
For the past decades, the Thai banking sector has been the largest financing provider to 
the economy with its peaks at the end of 1997 at 156% of the country’s GDP.  Its sheer 
size implies that banking sector has strong impact to the survival of Thai’s economy.  
Therefore, poor lending practices among Thai banks are problem not only to the banks 
themselves but also to the Thai economy.  After the financial crisis, Thai people had to 
share a huge burden of public debt arising from the Thai banking sector. The fiasco of 
Thai banking system in 1997 evidently shows the importance of credit risk management 
in both the banking business as well as the entire national economy. 
Although the current situation of Thai banking sector has emerged from the crisis, 
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lessons and experiences should not be forgotten.  Therefore, this study aims to 
understand the past mistakes in credit risk management of Thai banks, identify the 
solutions to improve credit risk management in Thailand, and assess the degree to which 
these solutions have already been implemented. 
1.2. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
1. To analyze the past mistakes in credit risk management of Thai banks before the 
Asian financial crisis. 
2. To study the development in credit risk management of Thai banks after the crisis.  
3. To identify the solutions to improve credit risk management in Thailand. 
1.3. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter two discusses credit risk definition, recent 
developments in credit risk measurement, and the loss concept. 
Chapter three provides the overview of Thai’s financial structure, players, market share, 
and the financial performance of Thai banks.  Then the chapter gives an overview on 
the credit market size and trends. 
Chapter four examines past mistakes in credit risk management of Thai banks before the 
crisis. The reason for such lending practices are also identified. 
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Chapter five provides the information on the development in Thai credit risk 
management after the crisis.  The chapter focuses on the infrastructure and regulatory 
reforms that affects bank’s credit risk management.   
Chapter six presents comments from banks’ top executives regarding current bank’s 
credit risk management of their banks.  Also, the chapter provides an analysis on 
changes in credit risk management process of Thai banks after the crisis.  
Chapter seven proposes recommendations for further improving credit risk management 
in Thailand. Finally, the conclusions are included in this chapter.  
________________
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CHAPTER 2: CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS 
2.1. WHAT IS CREDIT RISK? 
Credit risk is defined as the potential that a bank borrower or counter party will fail to 
meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms. The risk also includes the potential 
that counterpart is downgraded in its credit standing, with a corresponding increased cost 
for increasing capital reserves on the degraded loan. 
2.2. CREDIT RISK MEASUREMENT 
2.2.1. Expert System and subjective analysis  
Expert systems and subjective analysis or so-called banker “expert” system can be used 
to assess the credit risk.  In case of personal loans, bankers use information on various 
borrower characteristics to assess the credit risk of the borrower. These factors are 
borrower character (reputation), capital (leverage), capacity (cash flow), collateral 
(security), the so-called 4 “Cs” of credit, to reach a subjective judgement (i.e., that of an 
expert) as to whether or not to grant credit. 
For corporate loans, most banks would generally consider risk factors as follows: a) the 
company’s quality, b) the elements of loan being requested, c) the structure of the loan, 
and d) bank’s objectives. 
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a) Quality of the company 
In assessment of a company’s quality, banks consider the honesty and integrity of business 
and its management team, financial condition, size (sales revenue, total assets, or market 
capital), industry, position within the industry, and the reliability of the borrower’s 
financial statements.  Quality of management is a significant factor in credit risk 
assessment because it largely contributes to the success and financial strength of 
company.  Coyle Brian ((200) stated that the more objective indicators of management’s 
ability could be assessed according to the experience, expertise, and stability of the senior 
management team1. 
b) Element of Loan Requested 
The purpose of a loan, the payments plan, and collateral/guarantee are considered as the 
elements of loan.  The purpose of a loan must be clear and acceptable. For example, 
loan requested to finance the planned growing business is acceptable while a loan to 
settle existing debts could indicate a serious liquidity problem.   
Payment is being considered through financial statement analysis.  Financial statement 
                                                 
 
 
1 Coyle, Brian, Corporate Credit Analysis, Chicago: Glenlake Publishing Co., Ltd., 2000. 
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analysis focuses on the company’s debt service capacity considering its free cash flow, the 
liquidity of its balance sheet, and the firm’s access to sources of finance other than bank 
loans. Although numerous financial ratios are often used, most of the banks mainly look 
at historical and projected earnings, operating cash flow, interest coverage, and leverage 
in their financial ratio analysis.  
Lastly, banks find their protections in case the company’s default on loan by considering 
the collateral/guarantee. Banks normally take into accounts types, value, and liquidity of 
the collateral being offered.  A guarantee is applicable, banks would further evaluate the 
guarantor’s financial stability and integrity.  
c) Structure of the Loan 
The structure of the loan such as type of loan, terms, and covenants must be agreed by 
banks and the borrowing company.  Both parties must establish mutual understanding 
and agreement on payment period, fee, interest rate charged, and actions required if 
covenant(s) are not met. 
d) Bank’s objectives and target markets 
In order to maintaining banks’ portfolio objective, banks further consider if the loan 
meets its target market. The other question is whether the risk and reward from the 
transaction satisfy the bank’s profitability objective. 
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2.2.2. Quantitative models of credit risk measurements   
Altman and Saunders (1997) state that the credit risk measure of individual loan can be 
measured based on expert systems and subjective analysis and on more objective analysis 
using models of credit risk measurements2.  The recent trends over the past 20 years 
have increasingly moved towards more objectively based systems. These systems include 
account-based credit-scoring systems and other newer models of credit risk measurement. 
a) Account-based credit-scoring systems 
The financial accounting-based credit-scoring models are univariate accounting based 
credit-scoring systems, where the FI decision-maker compares various key accounting 
ratios of potential borrowers with industry or group norms.  The others are multivariate 
models where the key accounting variables are combined and weighted to produce either 
a credit risk score or a probability of default measure.  There are at least four 
methodological approaches to developing multivariate credit-scoring systems: the linear 
probabilty model, the logit model, the probit model, and the discriminant analysis model. 
                                                 
 
 
2 Altman, E. I., Saunders, A., “Credit Risk Management: Developments Over the Last 20 Years”, 
Journal of Banking and Finance 21 (1996): 1721-1742. 
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The best of example of multivariate models is Zeta model developed by E.I. Altman3.  
b) Other (newer) models of credit risk measurement 
The other newer group of credit risk models uses financial theory and more widely 
available financial equity market data to make inferences about default probabilities on 
debt and loan instruments.  Consequently, these models are most relevant in evaluating 
loans to larger borrowers in the corporate sector.  These models include the term 
structure of credit risk approach, mortality rate approach, RAROC models, Option 
models (including KMV credit monitor model), CreditMetrics, and Credit Risk+. 
2.2.3. Loan portfolio management and Concentration Risk 
Traditional credit analysis has focused on individual credits rather than on how they 
relate to a portfolio as a whole.  However, many recent credit losses suffered by banks, 
have resulted from excessive portfolio concentration in particular sectors.  Therefore, 
increasingly FIs have recognized their loans as constituting a portfolio and learn to 
measure credit concentration risk as well as the credit risk on individual loans.  Altman  
                                                 
 
 
3  Altman, E.I., 1968. Financial Ratios Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate 
Bankruptcy, Journal of Finance, 589-609. 
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and Saunders, 1998 state that the early approach includes (1) subjective analysis. The 
expert’s feel as to a maximum percent of loans to allocate to an economic sector or 
geographic location. (2) on limiting exposure in an area to a certain percent of capital (e.g. 
10%) or (3) on migration analysis measures the transition probabilities of relatively 
homogenous loans, in a given pool, moving from current to any number of possible 
default states, varying from 30 days overdue to charge-off4. Migration analysis plays a 
critical role in the recent Credit Metrics (1997) approach5.  More recently, the potential 
for applying modern portfolio theory (MPT) to loans and other fixed income 
instruments has been recognized.  
2.3. LOSS CONCEPTS  
The credit risk of  a loan involves the probability of  default (PD) and the fraction of  the 
loan’s value that is likely to be lost in the event of  default (LIED).  LIED is always 
specific to a given loan structure while PD is generally associated with the borrower.   
The product of  PD and LIED is the expected loss (EL) on the exposure in a statistical 
                                                 
 
 
4 Altman, E.I., Saunders, A., “ Credit Risk Measurement: Developments Over the Last 20 Years”, 
Journal of Banking and Finance 21 (1998): 1721-1742. 
5 ibid 
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sense. It represents an estimate of  the average percentage loss rate over time on a group 
of  loans all having the given expected loss.  
Expected Amount of  Loan Loss (EL) = Probability of  default (PD) X Loss rate in default (LD) 
__________________________
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CHAPTER 3: UNDERSTANDING THAI FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND                
BANKING INDUSTRY 
3.1. THE THAI FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 
3.1.1. The Players 
The Thai financial system consists of many different types of financial institutions 
supervised by different regulatory authorities based on their business activities.   
Commercial banks, international banking facilities (IBFs), specialized financial 
institutions, finance companies, credit foncier companies, and asset management 
companies are all under supervision of the Bank of Thailand (BoT).  The remaining 
financial institutions, i.e. securities companies, mutual fund companies and provident 
funds, are supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Thailand (SEC). In 
turn, Ministry of Finance regulates both the BoT and the SEC.    
3.1.2. Characteristics of Thai Financial Industry 
The importance of each financial player to the Thai financial system and economy can be 
demonstrated by their financing percentage relative to GDP as shown in the figure below.  
Over the past decades, Thai banks’ assets have been the largest financing to the Thai 
economy with its peak at the end of  1997 at 156 percent of  GDP.  Although the ratio 
has been dropped after the crisis, banks still account for about a half  of  Thai financial 
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markets. Its sheer size implies that banking sector has a strong impact on the survival of  
Thai economy.  Moreover, the figure shows that the Thai financial system is unbalanced 
with its bank credit-based financing which leads to high volatility of  country’s economy6. 
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Figure 1: Financing Relative to GDP in Thai Economy 
Remarks:  
1. Commercial Banks (includes SFIs), finance companies, credit foncier companies (total assets)  
2. Stocks (SET market capitalization at market value) 
3. Bonds (outstanding values of public and corporate bonds at par value) 
4. GDP (at current market price) 
Sources: Bank of Thailand, Stock Exchange of Thailand, Thai Bond Dealing Centre, NESD 
 
Lastly, the figure illustrates that bond market is increasing its role since 1998 while the 
                                                 
 
 
6.  Vichyanond Pakorn (1999) comments that before the 1997, about 70-80 percent of all financial 
intermediation in Asia was bank credit-based. The bulk of the US$125 billion of funds withdrawn from 
Asia during the region’s crisis comprised banking lending particularly the short term. 
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stock market is gradually coming back as the economy is on its road to recovery.   The 
reasons for increasing financing through capital market are economic recovery and 
disintermediation trends following the 1997-1998 financial crisis. After the crisis, banks have 
generally overhauled their lending systems and taken a more conservative approach.  
Facing such limitations, companies turn to more attractive financing sources i.e. equity 
and bonds. 
3.2. CREDIT MARKET IN THAILAND 
Banks largely dominates the credit market in Thailand. Bank’s loans on average account 
more than 90 percent of total loans. The proportion of loans to economic growth 
(loans/GDP) has declined since the crisis, suggesting that a number of corporates have  
Table 1: Loans Provided by Banks to Thai Economy  
 (in Million Baht) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Financial 5,204 6,020 6,485. 5,771 5,135.5 4,251 4,064.6 4,757 4,970 5,386
Banks 3,967 4,598 5,967 5,318 4,952 4,114 3,899 4,583 4,749 5,105
CB'sLoan/Tot 76% 76% 92% 92% 96% 97% 96% 96% 96% 95% 
CB's 95% 100% 126% 115% 107% 84% 76% 84% 80% 78% 
Source: Loan figures from Supervision Report 2004, Bank of Thailand 
Remark: GDP at current price from NESDB 
sought other cheaper sources of fund through stock and bond markets, retained earning, 
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or other alternatives. Nevertheless, business and consumer sector still relied on loans 
from financial institutions as the major source of fund. 
According to the below Figure 2, the trend of bank loan was sharply decreased right of 
the year of crisis 1997.  This declining bank lending growth can be attributed to the 
cyclical factors such as the Asian crisis and the economic downturn that reduced 
corporate loan demand.  The fallout from the 1997 crisis (and more recent downturns) 
in the form of non-performing loans (NPLs) and foreclosed properties have made banks 
more cautious in their lending decisions. These factors along with other factors such as 
increasing competition capital markets have put pressure on bank profits. 
Figure 2: Trends of Bank’s Loan 
Trend of Bank's Loan
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Source:  figures from Bank of Thailand’s database
However, the loan growth was again picking up in 2002 when the economy gradually 
recovered from the crisis.  Loan outstanding rose to 5.6 trillion baht in 2005, 
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representing a year-on-year increase of 11.3 percent, up from 3.8 percent in 2004. 
3.3. LOANS CONCENTRATIONS OF THAI BANKS 
For the past decade, banks have granted more than half of their credits to business sector. 
In 2005, business sector borrows about 59 percent of loan while the individual  
Figure 3: Credits Classified by Borrowers in 2005 
 
Credits Classified by Borrow ers in 2005
Non-resident
3%
Government
1%
State enterprises
2%
Businesses,
3,393 Billion Bht,
59%
Financial 
institutions,
30 Billion Bht,
6%
Financial 
institutions abroad
1%Individuals,  1,608 
Billion Bht, 28%
Source: Bank of Thailand’s database 
sector has 28 percent of credits granted. The remaining portions of loan are granted to 
domestic financial institutions (6%), non-resident (3%), state enterprises (2%), 
government (1%), and financial institutions abroad (1%) accordingly. 
3.3.1. Loan Concentration in each Business Sector 
According to Bank of Thailand data, all loan of commercial bank categorized into 10 
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main business sectors7 .  As shown in the figure 4, loans of commercial banks in 
Thailand are mainly concentrated in manufacturing, trading, personal consumption, 
banking and finance, and real estate. In year 2004, percentage of loan concentrations are 
27.3% in manufacturing, 17.4% in trading, 16% in personal consumption, 12.9% in 
banking and finance, and 7.4% in real estate.   The concentration of these loans in the 
mentioned business sectors are the result of economic structure in Thailand, in which for 
a decade almost 50% of country‘s GDP comes from manufacturing and trading sector. 
After the crisis in 1997, the trends of loan concentration have been changed with the 
increase in loans to banking and finance, public utilities, and personal consumption that 
are mostly composed of housing loans.  The ratios are from 8% to 12.9%, 2.5% to 
6.3%, and 12.3% to 16% respectively.   The shift of loan concentration to these 
business sectors after the crisis is because these business sectors are low risk-weighted 
loans according to Bank of Thailand’s capital requirement. Most of loans extended to all 
these three categories have a concessional risk weight of 0-0.5. 
                                                 
 
 
7. From December 2003, loan of Thai banking system has been classified into 13-business sector in 
accordance with the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC).  
However, the writer complied loan data in 2003 and 2004 in accordance to old classification system. 
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 Figure 4: Loan Concentration by Economic Sectors 
Loan Concentration by Economic Sectors- Major Sectors
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Source: Bank of Thailand’s database
3.4. COMMERCIAL BANKS IN THAILAND 
As of December 2005, there are a total of 34 banks operating in Thailand, of which 13 
are commercial banks registered in Thailand, 18 are branches of foreign banks, and 3 
state-owned banks. Based on the ownership structure banks in Thailand, banks can be 
divided into four groups: 1) private Thai banks, majority owned by Thai; 2) hybrid banks, 
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majority owned by foreigners; 3) state-owned banks, majority owned by government, and 
4) branch of foreign banks and their subsidiaries, owned by foreign banks overseas.  
 
Table 2: Market Share of  Banks in Thailand 
Banks Assets Percent of
Total
A t
Deposits Percent of
Total
D it
Loan Net* Percent of
Total Loan
No. of
Branches
Thai Private-Owned
Bangkok Bank 1,393,021 17.4% 1,156,530 18.9% 832,420 16.2% 685
Kasikorn Bank 837,699 10.5% 689,652 11.3% 592,013 11.5% 499
Siam Commercial Bank 807,773 10.1% 622,431 10.2% 554,289 10.8% 692
The Thai Military Bank 716,295 9.0% 517,214 8.5% 521,118 10.1% 426
Bank of Ayudhya 636,466 8.0% 553,532 9.1% 423,862 8.2% 490
Thanachart 195,478 2.4% 149,014 2.4% 82,043 1.6% 67
Tisco Bank 70,222 0.9% 34,611 0.6% 54,630 1.1% 15
Kiatnakin Bank 68,658 0.9% 41,580 0.7% 41,704 0.8% 17
ACL Bank Plc. 34,910 0.4% 21,513 0.4% 18,987 0.4% 1
Land and House Retail Bank Plc 9,315 0.1% 6,322 0.1% 6,211 0.1% 1
Hybrid Bank
United Overseas Bank 203,931 2.6% 152,602 2.5% 148,129 2.9% 154
Standard Chartered Nakornthon 139,687 1.7% 87,700 1.4% 84,472 1.6% 41
Sub-total 5,113,455 64% 4,032,701 66% 3,359,878 65% 3,088
State-owned Banks
Krungthai Bank 1,160,079 14.5% 983,212 16.1% 853,605 16.6% 643
Siam City Bank 451,826 5.7% 382,164 6.3% 289,451 5.6% 386
Bank Thai 269,119 3.4% 194,573 3.2% 114,842 2.2% 112
Sub-total 1,881,024 23.6% 1,559,949 0.26 1,257,898 24% 1,141
Total Banks Registered in Thailand 6,994,479 88% 5,592,650 1 4,617,776 90% 4,229
Intl Commercial Bank of China
(subsidiaries) 10,783 0.1% 4,874 0.1% 7,618 0.1% 2
Foreign Banks (18 Full Branch) 981,254 12.3% 516,583 8.4% 517,640 10.1% 18
Total Foreign Banks 992,037 12.4% 521,457 8.5% 525,258 10.2% 20
Total Commercial Banks 7,986,516 100% 6,114,107 100% 5,143,034 100% 4,249
Source : Bank of Thailand and Banks' Balance Sheets
Remark :  Loan is net of allowance for doubtful account
Thai Commercial Banks Market Share as of 31 December 2005
Unit: Million Baht
From table 2, it is shows that Thai banking industry is concentrated with the five largest 
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banks i.e. Bangkok Bank, Krung Thai Bank, Thai Farmer Bank, Siam Commercial Bank, 
and Thai Military Bank.  As of December 2005, the total assets of  top-five bank 
accounts for 62% of  the total bank assets, 65% of  total bank deposits and 65.2% of total 
bank loan. 
With no restriction on branch limit, locally owned banks have extensive branches 
throughout the country.  As of December 2005, there are 4,231 branches of Thai bank 
and hybrid banks countrywide.  Having such competitive advantage, locally owned 
banks capture both retail and corporate customers better than foreign banks.  Domestic 
banks are by far more important than foreign banks. 
Foreign bank branches incorporated in Thailand are restricted by branch limitation 
regulations so all of them are located in Bangkok. At the end of 2005, foreign banks have 
12.3 percent of total bank assets, 8.4% of total bank deposits, and 10.1% of total bank 
loans.  
With the introduction of the Financial Master Plan in 2003, the Thai banking industry 
has transformed into a new era.  The plan enforced financial institutions to reduce from 
commercial banks, finance companies, and credit fonciers to only two types of deposit-
taking institutions i.e. commercial bank and retail bank. As a result of the policy 
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enforcement, the Thai financial industry is undergoing an explosion of mergers, 
reorganization, re-licensing, and acquisitions. (See more details about the Financial 
Master Plan and its impact to Thai financial industry in Chapter 5). 
3.5. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 
3.5.1. Profitability 
The profitability of Thai commercial banks has continued to improve and their balance 
sheets have gradually strengthened.  At the end of 2004, the banks earned net profit 
(before extraordinary items) with the total net profit of 100 billion baht, almost twice that 
of previous year. Likewise, interest rate spread, net interest margin, and the overall 
operating efficiency continued to improve.  Major factors contributing to improved 
profitability were substantial increase in fee-based income, decrease in interest expense, 
progress in debt restructuring, and strategic adjustment towards expansion of high-
margin consumer loans.  Improved profits enabled Thai banks to accumulate their 
capital base and increase their ability to absorb risk. 
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 Figure 5: Profitability, Provision for Loss of Banks in Thailand 
Profitability and Provision for Loan Loss of Commercial Banks in Thailand
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Source: Bank of Thailand’s database 
Figure 6: Return on Assets of Banks in Thailand 
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All commercial banks in Thailand are able to set aside provision at a level higher than 
regulatory requirement. The actual to required provisioning ratio of Thai banks increased 
slightly from 137.3 percent in 2004 to 143 percent in 2005. 
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3.5.2. Capital Funds 
Banks in Thailand have been able to keep their capital funds above the regulatory 
requirements8 after the financial crisis. As December 2005, Thai banks’s tier 1 captial 
stood at 10.2 percent of risk assets while total capital funds reached 13.28 percent of risk 
assets.  Foreign banks also perform well and are able to maintain their capital funds at 
21.69 percent of risk assets.  For the whole banking sector, the capital adequacy ratio 
increases from 13.05 percent in 2004 to 14.19 percent in 2005. This figure means that the 
quality of capital for the Thai banking sector remain strong.  
Table 3: Capital Funds of  Banks in Thailand 
Capital Funds % of risk assets
Tier 1 Total Tier 1 Total
2001 293,098 436,740 8.91 13.28 73,749 19.52 510,489 13.92
2002 308,724 448,085 8.93 12.96 74,406 20.37 522,491 13.67
2003 377,508 529,953 9.57 13.43 74,144 20.45 604,097 14.02
2004 397,163 544,568 9.01 12.36 91,073 19.63 635,641 13.05
2005 502,645 666,388 10.02 13.28 131,060 21.69 797,448 14.19
Total Banks
Capital Funds
Year Capital Funds % of risk assets
Total Total
Unit : In Million baht
Thai Banks Foreign Banks
Source: Bank of Thailand 
                                                 
 
 
8 As of August 14, 1998, the minimum requirements of capital adequacy ratios are 4.25% (tier 1) and 
18.5% of risk assets for Thai banks, and 7.5% of risk assets for foreign banks.  
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3.5.3. Non-Performing Loans (NPLs)  
As previously mentioned in the credit market section, Thai private banks have always 
been the largest credit providers in the Thai credit market.  In 2005, private banks 
commanded the largest share of 65% in the credit market, while state-owned banks 
occupied only 24%. The foreign banks, on the other hand, occupied the smallest share of 
10.2% in 2005.     
However, with regard to asset quality, the private banks’ NPLs have also been the largest.  
As shown in figure 6 below, the portion of NPL of Thai private banks’s NPL was the 
highest except during year 1998 and 1999 when the NPL of state-owned banks were 
higher.  The primary reason for this is that the government took over six ailing private 
commercial banks after the crisis in 1997, so their NPL raised the average of state-owned 
banks. By end-December 2000, the NPLs’ figure improved significantly, with NPLs 
declining to 822 billion Baht, or 17.7% of total credit outstanding.  The substantially 
decrease in NPL was due to the fact that part of NPL was transferred to asset 
management companies. Moreover, a large amount of debt was restructured and written 
off at the end of the year.   
Thereafter, the decline of NPLs, however, has been steady.  As of end-December 2005, 
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aggregate NPL of commercial banks declined further to 470 billion baht (8.3% of total 
loans) compared to 570 billion baht (10.9% of total loans) in 2004.  The reduction in 
NPL resulted largely from the speeding up of debt restructuring, legal execution process, 
and debt write-offs.  
Figure 7: Non-Performing Loans 
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In summary, after the crisis, the financial performance of Thai banking sector is much 
healthier with improvement in profitability, stronger balance sheets, and declining figures 
of NPLs. 
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CHAPTER 4: CREDIT RISK ANALYSIS OF THAI BANKS BEFORE THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS YEAR 1997 
4.1. CONNECTED LENDING 
Before the financial crisis, connected lending to relatives, friends, and political ties was 
one of the most notorious malpractices among Thai banks. According to Charumilind, 
Kali, and Wiwattanakantang (1998), firms with connections to banks and politicians had 
greater access to long-term debt than firms without such ties9.  Connected firms needed 
much less collateral to obtain long term loans than those without connections.  They 
also do not find support for the existence of connections between banks and firms 
serving to reduce asymmetric information problems10.   
 
                                                 
 
 
9 Charumilind, Chutatong., Kali Raja., and Wiwattanakantang Yupana, “Connected Lending: Thailand 
before the Financial Crisis”, Journal of Business, forth coming, (SSRR online database). 
10  The information view argues that connection between banks and borrowers would help reduce 
information asymmetry and moral hazard problems. Connected lending should therefore be valuable 
both to the banks and firms. However, La Porta et al. (2003) noted, if connected lending improves 
information flows, then banks should be able to reduce its default rates, or at least have high recovery 
rates.  In the case of Thailand, high non-performing loans during and before the crisis is inconsistent 
with the information view and thus supports the connected lending view. 
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4.2. COLLATERAL-BASED LENDING 
Thai banks’ lending practices were largely collateral-based. Less attention was paid to 
cash flows or analyzes of project feasibility. Menkhoff/Neuberger/Suwanaporn 2003 
noted that Thai banks demand collateral more often and to a higher degree than banks in 
developed markets11. They use collateral primarily to reduce the perceived credit risk of 
smaller and younger firms and to provide house bank services to these firms. Collateral-
base lending behavior of Thai banks caused them to be vulnerable to real estate market. 
The explanations for heavy reliance on use of collateral in Thai banks can be contributed 
to the followings: 
Limited types of security allowed 
Many legal experts have commented on the deficiency of Thai law regarding the security 
interests permitted under Thai law.  As Sathitsuksomboon and Rattanopas (2002) 
commented, security interests over assets are rather limited in Thailand. The forms of 
security available under the Thai Civil and Commercial Code are primarily: (1) mortgage, 
                                                 
 
 
11 Menkhoff Lukas., Neuberger Doris., and Suwanaporn Chodechai, “Collateral-based Lending in 
Emerging Markets: Evidence from Thailand”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(1) 
(2006):1-21. 
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(2) pledge, and (3) corporate or personal guarantee (surety). Thailand does not recognize 
a variety of security interests including liens, encumbrances, and charges commonly 
found in common law countries12. Furthermore, only certain types of property specified 
under the law can be mortgaged, i.e. immovable property and certain types of registered 
movable property.  After the 1997 economic crisis, the need for Thai law to recognize 
other forms of security for mortgage has become more urgent.   
b) Bank of Thailand’s regulations  
According to Bank of Thailand’s regulation before 1995, commercial banks are allowed 
to add accrued interest back as principal if the total amount less than the value of 
collateral.  This regulation actually below international practices in which pending 
interest payment should be classified as non-performing loan, thus commercial banks 
require setting aside more provision immediately.  The regulation encouraged banks to 
overstate the appraised value of collateral.    
The regulation also allows banks to deduct the value of collateral prior to required 
provision calculation.  Although the Bank of Thailand requires banks to take a 10 
                                                 
 
 
12 Sathitsuksomboon, Charunun, and Rattanopas Dussadee., The Need for Secured Transactions Law, 
Tilleke & Gibbins International Ltd., September 2002. 
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percent haircut off the appraised value, it is unlikely that the amount would equal to 
potential loss, especially when most collateral are likely to be significantly overvalued. 
c) Real Estate Boom 
From 1957 to 1997, the Thai economy experienced high growth while the real estate 
price increased continuously.  Unfortunately, this real estate boom overshadowed the 
growing default risks inherent in the borrower since the banks believed the growing price 
of collaterized property would always be enough to compensate the loss given default.   
By over-reliance on collaterized properties, Thai banks had less incentive to assess the 
risk of the borrowers as well as monitoring them.  
4.3. POOR PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 
Because Thai banks carried excessive exposure to the real estate sector, non-performing 
of the whole banking industry was at peak of 46 percent at the end of 1998.  The 
concept of portfolio management was not given much attention during the pre-crisis 
period. There was little understanding of the benefits of portfolio diversification13, 
                                                 
 
 
13 The comment cited in the presentation of one senior executives of a Thai bank at Risk Symphosium, 
Bank of Thailand, 2003 
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instead the focus was on individual loan basis.  Bank’s loan policy did not state 
objectively the direction and limit for loan to a particular industry and a single borrower.  
Many Thai banks did not have in place a good monitoring system to measure the 
excessive risk taking in the portfolio of their lending.  In addition, the regulations were 
inadequately encouraged bank to emphasize on loan concentration in a single sector or a 
borrower. 
4.4. COMPROMISE OF CREDIT PRINCIPLES UNDER COMPETITION 
Thai banks in many cases granted loans carrying undue risks or unsatisfactory terms, with 
full knowledge of violating of sound credit principles.  With the property and stock 
price boom during 1992 to 1995, Thai economy experienced high growth and received 
large and deceptively cheap capital inflows.  Business expanded investment rapidly. The 
borrowers at that time had more bargaining power and could easily access loan from any 
banks. Having surplus funds, Thai banks were under competitive pressure to considered 
quantity more than quality of the loan portfolio. They did not expend resources on assess 
the underlying risks of neither borrowers nor collateral.  Loan pricing did not 
appropriately reflect borrower’s credit risk.  The situation worsen when Thai banks 
became less vigilant in screening borrowers and taking appropriate actions against 
borrowers once they showed signs of financial deterioration. This is because banks were 
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afraid to lose customers if they demanded a lot from them.  
4.5. BAD CREDIT CULTURE 
Treacy and Carey (1999) state that credit culture refers to an implicit understanding 
among bank personnel that certain standards of underwriting and loan management must 
be maintained14.  Caouette, Altman, Narayanan (1998) also mention that credit culture 
is the collection of principles, actions, deterrents, and rewards that exist within a lending 
organization15.  As mentioned earlier on connected lending, Thai banks were largely 
family-owned and managed by the family members who maintained power in the credit 
decision committee.  These people influenced credit decisions that were based on 
personal relationships.  The credit culture in many banks was deteriorating because 
preferential treatment to borrowers referred by the bank’s owners or intervention by 
government authorities. This cultivated lending practice for credit officer to pay less 
attention to borrower’s credit risk than to relationships. 
                                                 
 
 
14 Treacy William F., and Carey, Mark S., “ Credit Risk Rating at Large U.S. Bank’s”, Federal Reserve 
Bulletin 84-11 (1998):897-921. 
15 Caouette, John B., Altman, Edward I, and Narayanan, Paul., Managing Credit Risk: The Next Great 
Financial Challenge, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1998., page 31. 
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The internal rating system is one of a tool that can help promote and maintain a good 
credit culture within a bank.  Unfortunately, the internal rating system was not clearly 
stated and fully understood by credit staff.    
The credit analysis and approval process was not fostering sound credit principles.  
Credit officers had dual role of loan marketing and credit rating while their performance 
was base partly on the portfolio growth.  Such dual roles of credit officers often 
promote a conflict of interest.  
Moreover, the lack of independent credit audit worsens credit culture in the banks.  The 
audit department was not given enough power and independence from business unit. It 
often lacked support form the management and failed to receive full cooperation from 
the credit department. Because of this lack of power, the audit department tended to 
compromise with the credit department and did not seriously attempt to find weaknesses 
or misconduct in its credit audit. 
4.6. LAX SUPERVISION  
Prudential regulations, especially in the area of asset classification, asset valuation, loan 
review, corporate governance, and risk management were inadequate.  Bank of Thailand 
emphasized its supervision on transaction verification rather than risk-based supervision.   
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Bank examiners did not emphasize on strategic risks, operational risks, management’s 
ability to control risks, and corporate governance. 
As a result, the supervision and examination was focused on the assessment of bank’s 
present financial condition rather than bank’s present and future financial condition as 
well as risk management systems. 
4.7. OUTDATED LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
a) Non-consolidated supervision 
In 1999 the World Bank conducted an assessment of Thailand’s banking supervisory in 
compliance with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 25 Core Principles of 
Effective Banking Supervision and concluded that Thailand did not comply with the core 
principle concerning consolidated supervision. The underlying reason behind the non-
compliance is due to the fact that the current laws governing financial institutions under 
the supervision of the Bank of Thailand do not grant power to the Bank of Thailand to 
supervise financial institutions on a consolidated basis.    
In Thailand, commercial banks are under the Commercial Banking Act and directly 
supervised by Bank of Thailand.  On the other hand, finance companies and finance 
and securities companies are under the Act on the Undertaking of Finance Business, 
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Securities Business and Credit Foncier Business and are share-supervised by Bank of 
Thailand and Ministry of Finance.  Under Commercial Banking Act, banks are not 
allowed to form financial conglomerates, thus banks set up separately financial/securities 
companies to operate non- permitted businesses under the Commercial Banking Act.  
As a result, Bank of Thailand was not able to oversee bank’s total risk position, which is 
covered in its financial/securities subsidiary companies. 
b) Bankruptcy law and foreclosure procedures 
Before the crisis, the foreclosure law in Thailand involved lengthy procedure and did not 
allow banks to sell, foreclose or dispose of bad debts to stop losses.  Bankruptcy law 
was also outdated hindering the closure of bankrupt company/person.  According to 
PICS 16 report (2005), Thailand lags behind its neighboring countries in contract 
enforcement and closing of a business.  Thailand needs 390 days for contract 
enforcement compares to 75 days for Korea, 241 days for China, and 300 days for 
                                                 
 
 
16 The Thailand Productivity and Investment Climate Study (PICS), Albert Zeufack (2005), is the 
collaborative study of the Foundation of the Thailand Productivity Institute (FTPI), National 
Economics and Social Developoment Board (NESDB), and World Bank.  The study is based on a 
survey of 1,500 firms across Thailand.  It reflects the key constraints to doing business in Thailand 
and benchmarks Thailand’s investment climate with other countries in the region. 
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Malaysia.  The report also states that firms usually take on average 420 days to the 
maximum of 1,680 days to resolve disputes over the payments in the court.  To close a 
business in Thailand, it takes up to 3 years on average and costs 36 percent of the total 
estate value.  This is far greater than in Malaysia (2 years and 15 percent) or in China (2 
years and 22 percent). 
______________________
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CHAPTER 5: ROLES OF THE BANK OF THAILAND AFTER THE CRISIS 
Since the financial crisis, Thailand has undergone progressive financial reforms in several 
areas.  The Bank of Thailand has changed its supervisory approach to be tougher, and 
more engaged. Enforcement of the rules is much uncompromising. It has been moving 
away from transaction-based supervision and towards more risk-based and consolidated 
supervision.  In addition, the Bank of Thailand has issued several regulatory measures in 
an attempt to strengthen and improve Thai financial sector.  However, the most 
significant infrastructure and regulatory reforms that entirely change the landscape of 
Thai financial sector at present and in the coming years are the followings:  
5.1. INFRASTRUCTURE REFORM 
5.1.1. Restructuring of the Thai Financial System 
In the pre-crisis period, the Bank of Thailand was not able to oversee Thai banks on 
consolidated basis17. The problem led to the introduction of one presence policy under 
the Financial Master Plan.  According to the new policy, all types of the Thai financial 
                                                 
 
 
17  Please refer to chapter 4 regarding the problem of non-consolidated supervision for detail 
explanation. 
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institutions, which were once distinguished between commercial banks, finance 
companies, and credit fronciers, are required to merge or to apply to become either 
commercial banks or retail banks.  The policy, thus, allowed the Bank of Thailand to 
oversee total risk position of the bank’s which once was hidden in their 
financial/securities subsidiary companies. 
According to the policy, commercial banks are qualified and well-capitalized financial 
institutions requiring a minimum of Bt5 billion of tier-1 capital. These banks may 
provide most financial services to all groups of customers, but are not permitted to 
engage in trading, insurance underwriting and brokering, or underwriting equity securities.  
On the other hand, the retail banks in the definition differ from commercial banks with 
smaller capital requirement (Bt250 million of tier-1 capital) and a different range of 
services. Retail banks may offer financial services to retail customers and SMEs within 
the same limitations as commercial banks, but they cannot conduct business related to 
foreign exchange and derivatives products. 
Foreign banking institutions have long had a presence in Thailand in the form of full 
branches and Bangkok International Banking Facilities ("BIBFs"). Under the Plan, full 
branches of foreign banks are still permitted, while BIBFs are replaced by subsidiaries of 
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foreign banks.  Both full branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks may engage in the 
same scope of business as commercial banks, but they differ in capital requirements and 
branch allowances. 
 
Table 4: Key Characteristics for Commercial banks and Retail Banks 
 Commercial Bank Retail Banks
Tier 1 Capital 
requirement 
More than 5 billion More than 250 million 
Scope of business 
All financial service, except : 
(1) insurance underwriting;  
(2) brokering, trading, and 
underwriting of equity 
securities 
All financial service, except :
(1) insurance underwriting 
(2) brokering, trading, and 
underwriting of equity 
securities. 
(3) foreign exchange, 
(4) derivatives products 
(unless for banks' hedging 
purposes) 
Potential customers All Retail customers and SMEs 
Lending limits 25% of tier-1 capital 
(1) 0.05% of tier-1 capital 
for clean loans to retial 
customers 
(2) 1% of tier-1 capital for 
loans with collateral to retial 
customers 
(3) 10% of tier-1 capital for 
loans to SMEs 
Subsidiaries must maintain a minimum of Bt4 billion in capital. They are given a choice 
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between keeping a maximum of four branches in the country (one of which is allowed 
inside Bangkok and metropolitan areas, and the remaining three outside) and merging or 
acquiring another institution in order to upgrade its status. Full branches, on the other 
hand, are required a minimum of Bt3 billion, but may not open any branches. 
Figure 9: Restructuring of the Thai Financial System 
As the result of the plan, the landscape of the Thai financial system has entirely changed. 
The industry undergoes an explosion of acquisition and merger. The number of financial 
institutions under the supervision of the Bank of Thailand reduced from 83 at the end of 
2003 (before FSMP) to 44 at the end of 2004 (after FSMP).  Moreover, the policy 
poises to develop new banking participants and fundamentally new banking strategies. 
The players in this new landscape will range from the larger "universal banks" offering a 
complete spectrum of financial services to the smaller, more niche customer- and 
Source: Bank of Thailand, Supervision Report 2004 
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product-centered banks handling specific needs. In essence, One-presence policy 
encourages industry consolidation and more transparent presence of financial conglomerates among 
players in the industry. 
5.1.2. Establishment of Deposit Insurance 
In the case of Thailand, an explicit deposit insurance scheme did not exist prior to 1997. 
The extent and urgency of the 1997 financial crisis prompted the Thai authorities to 
resort to a temporary blanket guarantee to regain confidence in the financial institution 
system. Although the blanket guarantee proved to be effective in curtailing deposit runs 
and restoring public confidence, it has incurred a substantial cost to the government. The 
blanket guarantee, that Thai authorities provided support through the Financial 
Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) has several weaknesses i.e. moral hazard 
problem, depositors’ indifference to the riskiness of financial institutions, and substantial 
cost burdens to government.  
Mindful of such pitfall, the authority is planning for the implementation plan to establish 
a deposit insurance system with a limited guarantee in place of a blanket guarantee.  In 
this preparation, Deposit insurance agency (DIA) will be established and will take over 
the task of administering deposit insurance from the FIDF.  The establishment of 
Deposit Insurance Agency would limit cost of deposit guarantee currently bared by 
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government and the public.  The limited guarantee scheme would motivate depositors 
to focus on financial stability of banks.  The banks, in turn, would be pressured by 
depositors to improve their performance and increase discipline in credit risk 
management.   
At present, the Deposit Insurance Act was approved by the Parliament in 2004 and the 
legislation is under reviewing of Supreme Court Committee. 
5.1.3. Implementation of International Banking Standards 
Among the most eminent international banking standards is the New Basel Capital 
Accord (Basel II) introduced in June 2004 by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision.  The Basel II is being adopted worldwide since its framework 
comprehensively gauges capital requirement commensurate with risks inherent in 
individual financial institutions, while providing options of approach dependent on their 
risk management capacity. In August 2004, the Bank of Thailand announced the Basel II 
implementation plan to commence the simple approaches18 at the end of 2008 and the 
                                                 
 
 
18.The first pillar of BIS II required banks to maintain minimum capital requirement for operational risk 
and credit risk. The approach for capital calculations include the Standardize Approach, Foundation 
Internal Ratings-Based Approach (AFIR), Advanced Internal Ratings-Based Approch (AIRA) for 
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more advanced ones at the end of 2009.  
Moreover, the implementation of International Accounting Standard 39 (IAS 39), one of 
the most crucial accounting rules to financial institutions in terms of recognition and 
measurements of financial instruments will reflect more accurate financial positions of 
financial institutions. The Federation of Accounting Professions (FAP) plans to analyze 
and issue the IAS 39 in phases due to its complexity, while the Bank of Thailand will 
ensure that prudential regulations are consistent with the IAS 39 and subject to thorough 
impact assessment prior to enforcement. 
5.1.4. Establishment of Credit Bureau 
In the past, Thai banks were not able to obtain the real status of borrowers who borrow 
from many financial institutions. An inadequate information on borrower’s debt 
obligation resulted in an incomplete picture of borrower’s liabilities. Although there were 
several attempts to establish a credit bureau, the successful establishment happened only 
after the crisis when the need for credit information pooling became more urgent.   
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
credit risk, Basic Indicator Approach (BIA), Standardized Approach (SA), and Advanced Measurement 
Approach (AMA) for operational risk. 
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Credit Bureau Act was passed in November 2002 and became effective in March 2003. 
The passage of the Act led to opening of two private credit bureaus. One is Thai Credit 
Bureau Company which is set up by The Ministry Finance majority owned by 
Government Housing Bank and a local technical partner named Processing Centre 
Company.  The other is Central Credit Information Services which is initiated by Thai 
Banker’s Association and owned by 12 Thai commercial banks and two other foreign 
partners. Currently, the two firms are merged. 
5.1.5. Active use of Asset Management Companies (AMC) 
Many financial institutions were unable to raise fresh capital or grant credits due to their 
high level of NPLs. These problems could be mitigated somewhat by transferring the 
NPLs to an AMC. As such, the NPLs would be managed by specialized experts who 
could speed up the NPLs resolution or increase the recovery rate.  When commercial 
banks are left with mostly good assets, they can be expected to resume their normal 
banking business sooner. To support this process, the Government enacted the 
Emergency Decree on Asset Management Company, B.E. 2541 (1998) which grants 
privileges in terms of fees and taxes arising from the sale and transfer of assets of the 
financial institutions to the AMC.  Financial institutions which own more than 50% of 
an AMC’s shares must report its financial statements and calculate all prudential ratios on 
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a consolidated basis. 
Apart from private asset management companies, the key agencies responsible for 
expediting the process of debt restructuring are the Corporate Debt Restructuring 
Advisory Committee (CDRAC) and the Thai Asset Management Corporation (TAMC). 
The former was set up in 1998 as a facilitator or an independent intermediary in 
voluntary debt workouts with multiple creditors that are usually difficult to reach an 
agreement. Later CDRAC expanded its activity to small debtors who may not receive 
enough attention from banks. The latter was established in 2003 to manage impaired 
assets transferred mostly from state-owned banks and private asset management 
companies, in addition to debt restructuring and business reorganization.  
5.2. REGULATORY CHANGES 
In addition to the industry reform, Bank of Thailand has strengthened several rules to 
improve credit risk management of Thai banks such as: loan classification and provision, 
concentration of loan to borrower, collateral assessments, connected lending, real estate 
credit, and loan review.  
5.2.1. Loan classification and reserve provisioning 
Prior to December 31, 1998, banks were required to classify their impaired assets into 3 
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categories: substandard, doubtful, and loss with loans being considered impaired or 
substandard after being delinquent for 6 months. Beginning with the accounting period 
ending on December 31, 1998 onward, financial institutions were required to classify and 
provision for their assets both on- and off-balance sheets according to the obligors’ 
financial condition and debt repayment capability as well as the length of non-payments. 
Under the new rules, a loan which is 3 month overdue must be classified as substandard 
at the minimum.  Provisioning requirements were assigned to each asset classification as 
follows: 
(1) Assets classified as Pass require 1% provision 
(2) Assets classified as Special Mention require 2% provision 
(3) Assets classified as Substandard require 20% provision 
(4) Assets classified as Doubtful require 50% provision 
(5) Assets classified as Doubtful of Loss require 100% provision 
(6) Assets classified as Loss shall be written off 
5.2.2. Collateral assessments 
Under the current regulation, asset classification does not depend on collateral values; 
nevertheless financial institutions are allowed to deduct collateral -at an appropriate 
market valuation- from the loan book values prior to the calculation of any required 
provision. In principle, the appraised value should closely reflect the collateral’s current 
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market value. The BOT imposed additional appraisal and valuation requirements to be 
used when financial institutions calculate the required provision for impaired loans and 
the loss from debt restructuring. Specifically, for financial institutions with capital less 
than 8 billion Baht, independently performed appraisals are required for loans with a 
book value greater than 25 million Baht. Those institutions with capital of at least 8 
billion Baht are required to obtain an independently performed appraisal on all loans 
with a book value of greater than 50 million Baht.   
In 2004, the asset classification and provisioning regulation was strengthened. The 
regulations require that collateralized portion of loans classified as doubtful of loss be 
subject to incremental rate of provisioning based on the length of overdue period, unless 
the loans have been restructured or legal actions taken by financial institutions against the 
debtors.  
5.2.3. Connected lending 
- Limiting a bank’s lending to related companies to no more than 50% of 
shareholder’s equity or 25% of the company’s total liabilities or 5% of the bank’s 
Tier 1 capital, whichever is lowest. 
- Restricting a bank’s lending to related companies where cross-directorship exists. 
 52
- Prohibiting senior executives and directors of a bank from holding directorships in 
more than three business groups. 
5.2.4. Loan review 
Banks must submit loan review and contingent liability reports to the Bank of Thailand 
every quarter.  When reviewing the loans of a particular debtor, the contingent liability 
related to that debtor must also be reviewed. Furthermore, banks must review the 
contingent liabilities of the 20 largest debtors that have no outstanding balance on their 
loan accounts.  In addition, banks must perform loan review via an independent review 
process that is separate from the credit approval process. 
5.2.5. Credits in the real estate sector 
1. Demand side: The amount of credits granted to any person for residence valued 10 
million baht or more should not exceed 70 percent of the purchased price, whether the 
purpose is to purchase lands, condominiums, or houses, where such properties are used 
as collateral.  
2. Supply side: Financial institutions should submit a quarterly report on approvals of real 
estate loans whose credit lines are equal to or more than 100 million baht. Such report 
will help the Bank of Thailand in monitoring the current condition of the real estate 
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business. 
                       ___________________ 
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CHAPTER 6: CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER THE CRISIS 
6.1. THAI BANKS AND ITS CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES  
Thai banks are currently undergoing a progressive transformation. They are working hard 
to develop strong risk management practices and techniques in line with the Bank of 
Thailand's announcement of a phased approach to complying with the new Basel Accord 
(Basel II) by 2008.   To examine the readiness of Thai banks for their risk management 
capacities before the implementation of Basel II, the BoT’s research team 19  has 
conducted a survey during June to August 2005.  The team asked eighteen CEO of 
leading Thai banks and foreign banks operated in Thailand to assess their banks’ risk 
management system.  Although the survey assesses several aspects of banks’ risks, this 
paper will focus only on credit risk management. 
From the survey, all participating banks responded that they had set up separate risk 
management committee to monitor overall risks. In some banks, they set up a separate 
unit to oversee credit risk in particular.  The establishment of risk management 
                                                 
 
 
19  Posayananda, Roong., Nakornthab, Don., and Jittamai Pajongjit, “Changing Macroeconomic 
Environment and Financial Landscape: Challenges for the Banking Sector, BOT Symposium 2005. 
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committee is in line with pillar two of Basel II in which requires bank to have in place the 
infrastructure to examine, to evaluate, and to supervise bank’s risk management.   
The survey indicates that Thai banks are in the process of preparing their infrastructure 
for using risk management tools such as Economic Capital and Risk-Adjusted Return on 
Capital (RAROC) in capital allocation decisions while foreign banks have already 
employed such tools in their capital allocation decisions. The concept of Economic 
Capital and Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC) are used in calculating 
appropriate risk and return for loan pricing or allocation of banks’ capital. Unlike 
regulatory capital or ROE method, Economic Capital and RAROC help banks to 
allocate capital more efficiently. 
All banks in Thailand have prepared the systematic loan grading and standardized internal rating 
for corporate loan.  This is a significant step because internal credit risk rating help bank 
in loan origination process, portfolio monitoring, analysis of the adequacy of loan loss 
reserves or capital, profitability and loan pricing analysis.  The use of ratings would also 
provide significant inputs for the development of credit risk models of IRB approach in 
accordance to Basel II. 
Most banks are developing their infrastructure to integrate credit portfolio management models 
 56
into their credit risk management system.  By looking at loans as a portfolio instead of 
individual loan basis, banks can balance risk and returns more efficiently.  Credit 
portfolio management model(s) help bank setting lending limits and managing 
concentration risk.  Examples of these models are KMV Portfolio Manager, Credit 
Metrics, Credit Risk+ and Credit Portfolio view. 
The survey also shows that foreign banks and hybrid banks use risk-based provisioning 
methodology while Thai banks are at the stage of preparation to employ such methodology.  
By having loan loss provision directly linked to loan risk profile means that banks set 
aside their capital for loan loss based on probability of default and economic value of 
collateral.  Also in some cases, this methodology needs banks to reserve loan loss 
provision more than specific provision required by the BoT.  These banks would face 
fewer problems when the BoT implemented IAS 39 in which the concept of economic 
value of collateral applied. 
In general, the survey illustrates that all banks in Thailand are preparing themselves to 
scope with credit risk more efficiently.    
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6.2. CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT BUSINESS PROCESS ANALYSIS 
The author conducted the interviews with two senior credit managers at one Thai bank20 
regarding their views on general credit granting process.  The author also collected 
information from several banks’ annual reports to acquire the missing details. The 
followings are author’s analysis on changes of credit risk management process of Thai 
banks after the crisis.  The analysis will be analyzed from the initial process of credit 
policy and strategic formulation to the final process of credit review.  
Figure 10: Credit Business Process Chain  
 
6.2.1. Credit Policy and Strategy Formulation 
- The Board of Directors is responsible for approving and reviewing credit risk 
policies and credit risk strategy.   
- Previously credit staff was not well communicated on the credit objectives and 
                                                 
 
 
20 To comply with the bank’s policy, the interviewees requested that their names remain confidential. 
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policies.  Bank management is aware of such weakness and has improved 
communication within the organization so that all level of staff involved in the credit 
management process has common understanding bank’s credit policies and 
strategies.  Bank’s credit strategy usually includes target market, type of credit, 
economic sector, geographic location, maturity, and anticipated profitability.  The 
strategy is to be review annually while the credit policy is to be updated regularly. 
- Unlike the pre-crisis when there is only one risk committee to oversee all types of 
risks, many big banks set up separate Credit Risk Unit/Sub-committee to responsible 
for credit risk inherent in bank’s business transaction or products. 
- Thai bankers have increased their awareness on the importance of portfolio 
management by focusing on diversification and limit credit concentration on their 
portfolio.  Bangkok Bank, for example, established a separate Portfolio 
Management Unit to responsible for bank’s portfolio. In the case of Siam 
Commercial Bank, it hires the international consultant to develop a credit risk 
management solution that provides immediate credit portfolio analysis capabilities, 
exposure aggregation and customer categorization, and limit and exposure 
monitoring. 
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6.2.2. Underwriting and credit risk rating 
- In the previous days, underwriting and credit rating especially on corporate loan was 
conducted based on individual credit manager’s judgment.  The process was quite 
at random and without standardized process.  However, at present, Thai banks 
have improved the rating process to be more standardized with the establishment of 
clear guidelines and procedures on underwriting and credit risk rating.   The use of 
credit scoring is applied for retail and medium-sized loan while the credit rating is 
used for corporate loan. 
- In case of corporate loan, segregation of duties between Relationship Manager and 
Credit Analyst to prevent the conflict of interests. 
- For underwriting a loan, banks do not only consider collateral as the fist way out.  
The concept of risk-based lending are emphasized and incorporated into their credit 
underwriting.  Many banks state that they focus on basic credit principles without 
compromise – the real capacity of borrower to repay and willingness to repay the 
loan.  Some of the factors put into bank’s list of risk assessment questions are the 
purpose of credit and source of payment, expertise of the management, reputation 
of borrower, sensitivity of borrower’s business and industry to economic and market 
developments, borrower’s repayment history, cash flow projections, feasibility of the 
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business proposition, and value of collateral. 
- In the past, Thai banks priced loan based on relationship between the bank and 
customers.  Realizing of such mistake, Thai banks are now pricing their loan with 
the consideration of borrower’s risk. 
- The concept of economic value added and risk-adjusted return on capital is applied 
in capital allocation and credit underwriting.  
- In compliance with BOT’s requirement for Thai banks to follow the IRB approach 
of BIS, banks have been collecting their loss database to develop their own internal 
credit risk rating models.  Nakornthab Karnchanasia, and Piamchol (2004) indicate 
that Thai banking industry has lagged behind international best practices in credit 
risk management due to lack of quality default data both historically and at present21.  
However, Thai banks are currently working on their credit models and the 
estimation of their owned probability of default (PD).  Nakornthep, Karnchanasai, 
Piamchol also note that it is probably too earlier to expect Thai banks to have their 
                                                 
 
 
21 Nakornthab, Don., Karnchanasai, and Piamchol Suchot., “Bank Lending, the Housing Market, and 
Risks: A Test for Financial Fragility”, Bank of Thailand’s discussion paper,  Bank of Thailand 
Symposium, September 2004. 
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own estimates of loss given default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD) at this 
stage. Having owned PD data is already very good in the case of Thailand22. 
- In some banks, outside experts are hired to assist them in developing bank’s credit 
risk rating. For example, Krung Thai Bank hired experts from ING banks to work 
on their credit risk rating models and system including also in the area of portfolio 
management.  
- The timely and more accurate credit risk rating help bank to distinguish their risk 
more in detail. For example, Krung Thai Bank and Siam Commercial Bank increased 
their asset classification from 6 ranks to 13 ranks. 
6.2.3. Credit Approval  
There are several improvements in the credit approval function to avoid the conflict of 
interest and improve the economies of scale.  Thai banks have set up the credit 
approval unit as an independent unit and separated it from business origination units.  
They also centralized the credit approval operation at head office instead of retail branch.  
In addition, the credit approval is put in the form of committee or group of 3 persons. 
                                                 
 
 
22 ibid 
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6.2.4. Credit Monitoring  
Thai banks have increasingly invested in their IT infrastructure to monitoring the credit 
risk status of their customers on real-time basis by looking at industry condition, market 
price of stock, economic conditions.  The other warning signals, which are included 
into bank’s credit risk monitoring system, are covenant deviation, collateral devaluation, 
portfolio concentration, related parties lending, outstanding loans (detecting unpaid loan 
of more than seven days), and so on. 
6.2.5. Credit Review and Audit 
In pre-crisis period, when the management blindly focus on credit growth while the 
enforcement of credit disciplined was lax, the audit review unit was not given much 
respect and important from the business unit.  However, after the crisis, the role of 
credit review/audit unit has increasingly gained significance. Most big Thai banks have 
established a separate unit to responsible for review and updated procedures regularly.   
To avoid the conflict of interest, the credit audit unit is directly under the control of the 
Board of Directors not business unit as in the pre-crisis period.  They will also summit 
the audit reports directly to the Board of Directors and senior executive staff.  
_________________________
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CHAPTER 7: RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION 
7.1. RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1.1. Enforcement of disciplined credit culture 
i. Bank’s CEO and Management’s discipline 
“Institutions generally fail not because they lack elaborately prepared credit policies, 
procedures, but because they have a prevailing credit culture that makes the deployment 
of these systems, policies and procedures meaningless.23” After all these improvements in 
Thai bank’s credit risk management business systems and IT investment, the challenges 
remains on how long the management will consistently adhere to this sound credit risk 
system. One important factor is the commitment from bank’s CEO and senior 
management themselves to embed the credit risk management culture in the heart of the 
decision-making process of the bank.  Therefore, Thai bank management should take 
personal responsibility for establishing and maintaining their organization’s credit culture.  
                                                 
 
 
23 Caouette John B., Edward I. Altman, Paul Narayanan, Managing Credit Risk: The Next Great 
Financial Challenge, Chapter 2 : Credit Culture, pg. 24-25. 
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ii. Compensation System 
To shape the credit culture in an organization, bank’s compensation system must be set 
up in way that promotes strong credit discipline among its staff.  However, many Thai 
banks still struggle to find out the credit rewarding system that promotes the long-term 
profitability of the bank not the short-term growth. For example, most of relationship 
managers rarely monitor the quality of credit after they originate the loan. This is because 
many banks do not tie relationship manager’s performance with the quality of credit.  
The management, therefore, should be aware of the fact.  
7.1.2. Avoid Government Interventions 
Thai banks, especially state-enterprise banks, often face the intervention from 
government authorities and politicians who push banks to expand their credits at high 
level.  These interventions compel Thai banks to compromise underwriting standards, 
the practice that may lead Thai banks to repeat the same failure as in the pre-crisis period.  
The authorities should be aware of such risk and avoid such practice.  
7.1.3. Training more expertise in risk management 
Thai banks will also need to develop strong risk management practices and techniques in 
line with the Bank of Thailand's announcement of a phased approach to complying with 
the new Basel Accord (Basel II) by 2008.  As the Thai banks prepare themselves 
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through the purchase of new systems infrastructures, a number of outstanding issues 
remain. For example, who will operate these new risk management systems? Who will 
interpret and react to the new reports? And who can use this information to better guide 
the bank in its business decisions?   In addition, as Basel II is a new concept in 
Thailand, the demand for experienced risk managers is in short supply.  To solve this 
shortage of risk experts, The Bank of Thailand should implement domestically the 
certificate-training program, or the Thai authorities should allow more employment of 
international risk management experts. 
7.1.4. Diversify collateral for bank lending 
Now most Thai savings channeled to the domestic economy are channeled through a 
few banks and collateralized by property. This scarcity of collateral can lead to future 
booms and busts in property. Under the present Thai law, only certain types of property 
can be mortgaged, the law should be amended to allow banks to accept other forms of 
property as security such as receivables, inventory, etc. This could increase lending to 
SMEs, including those in the service sector. 
7.1.5. Legal reforms in bankruptcy process 
The legal and judicial regime for bankruptcy rehabilitation should be improved to 
disallow transactions among connected parties, which damage the estate. Further 
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enhancements are needed to civil procedures to expedite the multi-year foreclosure 
process, both to obtain judgments and to sell the collateral.  
7.1.6. Market Development for Derivatives and Securitization 
The unbalance financial structure of Thailand where its depends largely on bank-credit. 
Thai financial market lacks sophisticated market for derivatives and securitization 
products that help companies and banks to effectively manage their risk.  Therefore the 
enhancement in the infrastructure for derivatives and securitization is needed. Pakorn24 
notes the variety of financial products and the depth of capital market will shift the 
structure of Thailand’s financial structure from bank-led to market-based intermediation. 
These will result in less volatility and great focus on profits as well as economic 
fundamentals. 
7.2. CONCLUSION 
The financial crisis in 1997 has inevitably brought about changes to the credit risk 
management of Thai banks and the Thai authorities.  The Bank of Thailand has 
                                                 
 
 
24 Vichyanond, Pakorn. Complicated Difficulties behind Financial Resolution: The Case of Thailand,  
Bangkok, March 2002, Thailand Development Research Institute, pg 30 No. 76. 
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introduced several proactive supervision measures to improve the credit risk 
management in the Thai banking industry.  These measures include drastic reforms in 
Thai’s financial structure and regulatory measures as well as adoption of international 
standards (BIS II).  In the meanwhile, Thai banks have increased awareness in credit 
risk management by changing in lending behavior, focusing on portfolio management, 
and investing in IT infrastructure.  Although there are still many changes lie ahead 
towards the betterment of credit risk management, Thai banks and Thai authorities are 
moving towards the right direction. 
_____________________
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